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From the Fringes of Copyright Law:
Examining California's "True Name and
Address" Internet Piracy Statute
by BRIAN MCFARLIN*
I. Introduction
As high-speed Internet connections have gained popularity, the illegal
trading of copyrighted files has quickly become a major issue. Some
studies estimate that almost twenty billion songs were illegally downloaded
in 2005.1 Although popular media services, such as Apple's iTunes store,
now offer legal copies of songs and videos for download, many Internet
users are still stealing copyrighted material.2  The Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), an organization representing a
conglomerate of music labels in the United States, has been working to
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2004,
Political Science and History, University of Michigan. His legal experience has ranged from
government work to large and small firms. Beyond the law, his interests include writing, amateur
filmmaking, guitar, and discussing fine scotch. He dedicates this note to his parents, who
nurtured him with legal knowledge from a young age. He would also like to thank Professor
Calvin Massey and the CLQ team for their help in editing this note.
1. INT'L FED'N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 2006 PIRACY
REPORT 4 (2006), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/piracy-report2006.pdf. A study also
showed that major U.S. motion picture studios lost $6.1 billion in 2005 to piracy worldwide.
L.E.K. CONSULTING, THE COST OF MOVIE PIRACY 4 (2006), http://www.fact-
uk.org.uk/site/media-centre/documents/2006_05_031eksumm.pdf.
2. At MacWorld in Jan. 2008, Apple announced that it has sold four billion songs, 125
million TV shows, and 7 million movies since the launch of its iTunes store. Bryan Collins,
Apple Launches 'World's Thinnest Notebook,' ELECTRIC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2008,
http://www.electricnews.net/arficle/10123732.html. However, many services which offer
infringing files, such as The Pirate Bay, are as well-known and perhaps even more popular than
iTunes and other legitimate services. See, e.g., Dan Mitchell, Pirates Take Sweden, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2006, at C5.
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curb this music piracy by taking legal action against copyright infringers.3
While the RIAA and their member labels are conflicted on whether
lawsuits are the best method for combating Internet piracy, the filing of
such suits has continued.4
While the RIAA and other such organizations have won many of these
suits, one of the major problems they have had with prosecuting pirates of
copyrighted material is identifying who is sharing what. Most Internet
pirating now occurs on peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks, which are
computer networks that enable millions of users to connect with each other
and share files.5 However, recent cases have made it difficult for copyright
holders to close down these P2P networks directly.6 The RIAA and other
copyright owners have turned to methods such as using automated web
crawlers to scour file sharing networks for the unique Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses of those users sharing or downloading copyrighted materials.
7
However, the IP address, by itself, does not have much use because it does
not give the name or specific location of the user.8 Turning this IP address
into a name can be nearly impossible.9 Only the user's Internet Service
3. See Hilary Rosen, For the Record, for What It's Worth, THE HUFFINGTON POST, June 4,
2006, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070218180330/ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
hilary-rosen/for-the-record-for-what- b 22177.html.
4. A study suggests that the lawsuits have affected large file-swappers but have had little
effect on those who only offer less than 1,000 files and little effect on the availability of files at
any given time. See Symposium, Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An
Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions, 49 J. L. & ECON. 91 (2006). However, a recent stream
of legal and legislative successes might suggest that curbing piracy using lawsuits will be more
successful in the future. See Declan McCullagh, RIAA's Next Moves in Washington, CNET NEWS,
May 26, 2006, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/ itmanagement/0, 1000000308,39271312, 00.htm?r= 1.
5. See Douglas Heingartner, Software Piracy Is in Resurgence, with New Safeguards
Eroded by File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at C9. These P2P networks enable the quick
exponential proliferation of files from user to user. For example, once a single user posts a
popular copyrighted work, such as a new or as-yet-unreleased movie, P2P technology allows
others to download the file from the user and in turn also make it available on the network. With
some P2P networks, like BitTorrent, the speed of file transfer actually increases when more users
are downloading a file. See Carmen Carmack, How BitTorrent Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/ bittorrent.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
6. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding that a P2P
network defendant who provides infringing material must actually induce the commission of
copyright infringements to be convicted).
7. See Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 9 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 7 (2004). The
RIAA also has a team of specialists who hunt down pirated content on the Internet and P2P
programs. See RIAA.com, Piracy: Online and On The Street, http://www.riaa.com/
physicalpiracy.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
8. See Mikel R. Boeve, Will Internet Service Providers Be Forced to Turn in Their
Copyright Infringing Customers? The Power of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Subpoena
Provision After In Re Charter Communications, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 118-19 (2006).
9. Id.
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Provider (ISP) can link the IP address to a name, and ISPs, because they
wish to protect their customers, are often unwilling to turn this information
over without legal action.' Also, if an ISP is outside the United States,
making use of a court's subpoena power would be difficult, if not
impossible. '
In response to this problem, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 to deal with copyright infringement on the
Internet and to identify alleged infringers. 12 The DMCA provided a way
for copyright holders to issue subpoenas against ISPs to release personal
information about alleged copyright infringers. 13  This DMCA subpoena
power, unlike more traditional methods of subpoenaing, does not require
the approval of a judge in obtaining a warrant. 14
However, as technology has changed, the DMCA's subpoena power
has become mostly worthless, as demonstrated in RIAA v. Verizon Internet
Services. 15 In Verizon, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit found that the RIAA could only use DMCA subpoenas
against ISPs who are actually storing infringing material on their servers.
16
Since most of today's P2P file sharing software allow users to search and
transfer files without the use of a centralized server, the power of copyright
holders to subpoena under the DMCA became vastly limited. 17 Copyright
holders could still obtain the identity of alleged copyright infringers
through other methods, such as a John Doe proceeding, but such a
subpoena would require judicial approval and the burden on the copyright
holder to justify breaching the anonymity of a defendant would be much
10. Id.
11. Converting an IP address into personal information might even require going through several
ISPs, which could in turn require several subpoenas and sifting through reams of data. See Joel Snyder,
Tracking Internet Piracy: Harder Than You Think, CIRCLEID, Dec. 31, 2004,
http://www.circleid.com/posts/tracking-intemet-piracy-harder-than.youthink/. Even if the personal
information is found, this only identifies the person who registered with the ISP, not necessarily the
copyright infringer. For example, there have been several cases where users charged with Internet
piracy have successfully defended against the charge by claiming the piracy was committed by
someone else who accessed the users' unencrypted wireless network. See Eliot Van Buskirk, R/AA
Fights Back Threatens Open Wi-Fi, WIRED BLOG NETWORK (LISTENING POST), Feb. 22, 2007,
http://blog.wired.com/music/2007/02/riaa-contestsd.htnl.
12. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. No. 105-90, at 2 (1998).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006).
14. Id.
15. RIAA v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
16. Id.
17. See David Gorski, The Future of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Subpoena Power on the Internet in Light of the Verizon Cases, 24 REV. LITIG. 149, 165 (2005).
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higher than for a DMCA subpoena.1 8 Rulings like that in Verizon, when
combined with the already high cost and large amount of time required to
build a case against an alleged copyright infringer, severely limit a
copyright holder's options.
Bruised but not beaten, the RIAA and other copyright holders tried to
find other ways to easily identify copyright infringers without the
limitations presented under the DMCA. One such method involved going
outside of federal copyright law entirely and creating new state crimes that
mirrored their federal counterparts. In Part II of this article, I will examine
one such state law, California Penal Code section 653aa. In Part III, I will
explore the constitutional and public policy concerns raised by the statute.
In Part IV, I will propose legislation that accomplishes the copyright
holder's goal of identifying copyright infringers, but implicates fewer
preemption issues and includes better safeguards aimed at protecting
individual privacy rights and public safety than does section 653aa.
II. An Overview of California Penal Code Section 653aa
In 2004, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law
California Penal Code section 653aa, which became effective on January 1,
2005.19 Under the statute, anyone located in California who, "knowing that
a particular recording or audiovisual work is commercial, knowingly
electronically disseminates all or substantially all of that commercial
recording or audiovisual work to more than 10 other people without
disclosing his or her email address, and the title of the recording or
audiovisual work" is guilty of a misdemeanor. 20  The statute defines a
"commercial recording or audiovisual work" as "a recording or audiovisual
work whose copyright owner, or assignee, authorized agent, or licensee,
has made or intends to make available for sale, rental, or for performance
or exhibition to the public under license.",2' "Audiovisual work[s]" include
motion pictures, television programs, and video or computer games.22
The statute provides specific consequences for both minors and adults.
Adults are subject to a fine not exceeding $2,500 and/or imprisonment in a
18. A John Doe proceeding is an action where the identity of the defendant is unknown, and
the name "John Doe" is assigned to the defendant. Courts, however, have many requirements for
allowing such a proceeding. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 767-68 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
19. Mark Martin & Lynda Gledhill, Governor Signs Internet Privacy Bill, Email Address
Required to Share Music, Movies Online, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2004, at B2.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653aa(a) (West 2006).
21. Id. § 653aa(g)(3).
22. Id. § 653aa(g)(2).
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county jail for a period not exceeding one year. Minors are only subject
to a $250 fine, but, upon a third or subsequent violation, they are
punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000 and/or imprisonment in a county
jail for a period not to exceed one year.24 For both adults and minors the
court will order the permanent deletion of the offending file.25
There are some exceptions to this rule. Those who only transfer the
commercial recording to his or her immediate family or within his or her
personal network do not violate the Act.26 Regardless, such private
transfers of infringing material are likely not to apply under the Act
because the user would probably not be sharing with ten or more people.
Those who have permission or are acting under the authority of the
copyright owner are also exempt under the Act.27 ISPs that enable their
users to share files are also exempt if they keep their email address or other
means of electronic notification on their website.28 It is noteworthy,
though, that there is no specific exception for fair use of the copyrighted
material as there is under federal copyright law.29
A stated purpose of the statute was to "allow state law enforcement
authorities to pursue copyright violations, since the vast majority of
individuals who are using P2P networks to violate copyright law are
unlikely to comply with the bill's true name and address requirement., 30 In
short, legislators were attempting to build a trap for the unwary designed to
allow the state to essentially enforce copyright law in state courts.
Going beyond mirroring federal law, this law actually allows
copyright holders to identify pirating users in a way not allowed by federal
copyright law. Through this statute, copyright holders have a relatively
easy and effective cause of action regardless of whether a copyright
infringer chooses to reveal his or her personal information online. If an
alleged infringer does embed their physical or email address with the title
of the full commercial work to their file, copyright holders can easily find
out whether the file is a copyrighted and, if so, directly contact and sue the
23. Id. § 653aa(a).
24. Id. § 653aa(b).
25. Id. § 653aa(e).
26. Id. § 653aa(c)(1).
27. Id. § 653aa(c)(2).
28. Id. § 653aa(f).
29. The fair use doctrine allows, under certain circumstances, the use of copyrighted
materials for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, and teaching. See 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2006).
30. Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis of S. 1506, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2
(Cal. 2004), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov (search 2003-2004 session for Bill Number 1506).
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infringer under federal copyright law without having to subpoena their ISP.
If an alleged copyright infringer does not include all of this information,
she can be held liable under both state criminal law and federal copyright
law, provided that the copyright holder is able to identify the infringer.
In addition to allowing easier identification of alleged copyright
infringers, section 653aa's state criminal cause of action has other
advantages for copyright holders. The statute bypasses many of the
limitations of federal copyright law, such as exceptions for fair use.31 Also,
the state cause of action brings in state criminal enforcement resources to
aid federal agents in locating copyright infringers.32 Lastly, the state cause
of action allows state courts to adjudicate what are essentially federal
copyright issues.
III. Constitutional and Public Policy Issues Arising From
California Penal Code Section 653aa
The creation of all of these powers in section 653aa raises serious
concerns about the legality of the statute and whether its enforcement
would be best for the community and the rights of individuals. Is it really
in California's interest to enforce a law that makes it a crime to fail to make
your personal information available online? Does the law unduly infringe
on the general policies of the state or federal government? Does the
creation of a state law touching copyright issues unduly invade upon
federal copyright laws? To answer these questions, we must weigh the
copyright holder's legitimate interest in maintaining control over their own
property against the rights of the individual to maintain their privacy and
the rights of the community in deciding on where to allocate the
government's limited resources.
A. Constitutional Issues
1. Preemption of California Penal Code Section 653aa by
Federal Copyright Law Under Both the Specific Provisions of the
Copyright Act of 1976 and General Preemption Doctrines
The United States Constitution, in its Copyright Clause, gives
Congress the power to enact statutes "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The fair use exception will be discussed in further detail
later in this article. See infra Part III.A. I .b.
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653aa (West 2006).
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 33  James
Madison affirmed this assertion, stating that, in the area of copyright, "[t]he
',04States cannot separately make effectual provisions ....
While Congress originally allowed states to legislate in this area, they
revoked this right through the Copyright Act of 1976, which, with some
exceptions, preempted state powers over copyright.35 The Act was passed
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, which allows the federal government to
claim exclusive power to use their enumerated powers.36 Under the Act,
state law cannot provide protection for a work that federal law does not
protect.37
a. Federal Preemption Under § 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976
Through § 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress specifically
preempted various state copyright laws.38 Thus, in order to determine
whether a specific state law is preempted by federal copyright law, courts
usually do not have to resort to standard preemption tests and instead just
analyze the statute through the two-pronged test set forth in § 301.'9 First,
to be preempted, the state law must create "legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by Section 106.,, 40 The fact that a state law might
offer additional remedies to the federal law does not preclude it from
preemption if the right itself is based in federal copyright law.4' Second,
the nature of the works protected in the state law must "come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102 and 103 .....,4
Under the first prong of this test, a state law is subject to preemption if
it involves any rights "that are the equivalent of copyright. 43 A right is
equivalent to copyright when it is infringed by the mere act of
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
35. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)). Some of these exceptions include common law copyright
violations and, as I will discuss later, state laws respecting sound recordings fixed before Feb. 15,
1972. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
37. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 131 (1976).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
39. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
41. See Pena-Rivera v. Editorial Am., S.A., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1061 (S.D. Fla.
1997).
42. Id.
43. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976).
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reproduction, performance, distribution, or display. 4  However, if other
material elements are required in addition to these acts in order to create a
cause of action under the state law, then there is no preemption under the
Copyright Act. 45 To avoid preemption, the additional elements in the state
law "must regulate conduct qualitatively different from the conduct
governed by federal copyright law."A"6 This means that if a state law merely
duplicates the typical copyright violations already covered by federal law,
the state law is preempted and is invalid.
Whether California's "True Name and Address" statute is preempted
under the first prong of § 301 hinges on whether its additional elements are
considered material. Section 653aa, like federal copyright law, protects the
right of copyright holders to prevent the unauthorized distribution of their
works. Unlike federal law, though, this statute adds a requirement that the
copyrighted work must be distributed with the infringer's name and
address. The statute also adds the requirements that the conduct is
"knowing" and that the works distributed are "commercial." While section
653aa's penalty is allegedly for refusing to provide the proper information,
a closer look reveals that these additional elements might not be sufficient
enough to avoid preemption under § 301's first prong.47 The true
legislative intent behind section 653aa was to prevent the unauthorized
copying, distributing, or displaying of a copyrighted work. 48 This means
44. Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1993).
45. Id. Under this test, for example, contract and trade secret law claims are typically not
preempted even if the breach involves copyright because they require proof of an additional
element (e.g., an agreement or a confidential relationship). See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992).
46. Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 659.
47. Whether these additional elements are sufficient for section 653aa to escape federal
preemption is a close call. "This effort [in section 653aa] to address issues created by so-called
peer-to-peer online technology reflects reasonable policy considerations, but very likely
encounters preemption issues. The subject matter involved is clearly copyrightable subject
matter. The wrongful acts involve copying and distribution--exclusive rights under copyright
law. The preemption issues will lie in whether the requirements of 'knowing' conduct,
'commercial' works, and failing to provide an email address and title are a sufficiently
quantitative extra element to take the statute out of the range of preemption. The issue is very
close." RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY TOWLE, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS § 3.07 (2003 & Supp. 2005). At least one court suggests that "the additional
elements of 'knowledge' and 'intent' required under state law do not afford plaintiff rights that
are 'different in kind' from those protected by the copyright laws." Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp. 848, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
48. "[Senator] Murray says the point isn't to take names; his idea is to give state
prosecutors, who have no jurisdiction over copyright infringement, a charge they can bring
against online pirates." Jim Healy, Setting a Trap for Net Pirates, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at
Cl.
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that the state law is essentially punishing conduct that is already regulated
under federal copyright law. Furthermore, the entire purpose of the act is
to make it easier for the RIAA and other copyright holders to identify and
sue copyright infringers under federal law.49 Someone being charged under
section 653aa is essentially being prosecuted for copyright infringement
under state law as a means for bypassing federal copyright laws, a result
which conflicts with Congress's intent to have exclusive federal power
over copyright law. The conduct being regulated by section 653aa does not
seem to be qualitatively different than the conduct regulated under federal
copyright law, so it might be considered the "equivalent of copyright."
It is true that forty-five states, including California, already have long-
standing, presumably legitimate statutes that are, in some respects, similar
to section 653aa.50 These statues typically require that the true name and
address of the manufacturer be printed on sound recordings intended for
sale or rental.5' In Anderson v. Nidorf the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
conviction under California Penal Code section 653w, which required
disclosure of the true name and address of the manufacturer of any
audiotape or videotape offered or possessed for the purposes of sale, in
spite of claims that it was preempted by federal copyright law.52 The court
reasoned that since the statute "does not prohibit the reproduction of
copyrighted works, but rather prohibits selling recordings without
disclosing the manufacturer and author of the recording (regardless of its
copyright status), the federal copyright laws do not preempt the state
statute. 53 The court also found that since the statute was not just designed
to protect copyright owners, but was also meant to protect consumers from
deceptive commercial practices, it incorporated material elements beyond
federal copyright law, as required under § 301 of the Copyright Act of
1976. 54
However, the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit in Nidorf to reject
the federal preemption argument is not as persuasive when applied to
section 653aa. One could analogize to Nidorf and claim that section 653aa
does not prohibit the reproduction of copyrighted works, but merely
prohibits Internet file sharers from distributing commercial works without
49. See Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis of S. 1506, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2
(Cal. 2004), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov (search 2003-2004 session for Bill Number 1506).
50. MPAA.org, Piracy and the Law - State Law, http://www.mpaa.org/piracy- StateLaw.asp
(last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
51. Id.
52. Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 102 (9th Cir. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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disclosing the sharer's true name and address. Unlike in the section 653w
statute examined in Nidorf though, section 653aa only targets copyrighted
files and does not involve any commercial transactions." Without these
two key additional material elements that protect interests outside of
federal copyright law, section 653aa does not fare as well as section 653w
on the first prong of a § 301 analysis. Also, unlike section 653w, which the
Ninth Circuit claimed was also meant to accomplish the state interest in
protecting consumers from unknowingly receiving bootleg merchandise,
section 653aa is only intended to protect the interests of copyright holders,
a distinctly federal interest.56 The legislative history confirms this assertion
as it does not show any legislative intention beyond protecting copyright
interests.57 The Internet piracy that section 653aa regulates does not
involve any illicit financial gain from sellers or consumer fraud; the only
party that really needs protection from such a transaction is the copyright
holder.
Since section 653aa does not involve the material elements apparent in
statutes like section 653w, and the essential purpose of section 653aa is to
protect copyright, it is probable that a court would find that section 653aa
violates the first prong of the § 301 test.
Under the second prong of the § 301 test, the works covered under
section 653aa must fit within one of the general subjects enumerated in
§ 102 or § 103 of the Copyright Act.58 Section 102 of the Copyright Act
specifically mentions "motion pictures and other audiovisual works,"
which includes movies, television programs, and video games. 59  This
would coincide with section 653aa's coverage of "audiovisual works."
"Sound recordings" are also listed in § 102 of the Copyright Act, which
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653aa (West 2006).
56. Nidorf, 26 F.3d at 102.
57. See Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis of S. 1506, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2
(Cal. 2004), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov (search 2003-2004 session for Bill Number 1506).
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) claimed in support of the section 653aa that
the bill would also "alert California consumers from whom they are downloading files, in case the
files contain viruses or other harms, or may be counterfeit." Id. at 4. However, the bill does not
accomplish this objective because it is unlikely that a user sharing a file with virus or a counterfeit
file will choose to share their personal information. Also, it is unclear what action, if any, a user
could or would want to take once they downloaded a copyrighted file with a virus if they have the
file sharer's personal information. Regardless, the legislative history does not show that the
legislature considered this to be a purpose of the statute.
58. See Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (1lth Cir. 1983) (holding that application of a
criminal law prohibiting dealing in stolen property to sale of pirated sound recordings was
preempted by the Copyright Act).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
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would coincide with the "music files" mentioned in section 653aa.6°
However, as § 301(c) of the Copyright Act notes, "[w]ith respect to sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this
title until February 15, 2067.,,61 This means that "state prosecutions for
criminal activity with respect to copyright infringement are, of course,
preempted, except as regards pre-1972 sound recordings." 62  Thus,
California Penal Code section 653aa is invalid under this prong, at least
when applied to sound recordings fixed after the 1972 date. Other penal
statues dealing with violations of copyright for sound recordings, such as
California Penal Code section 653h, often specify that they do not apply to
recordings after the 1972 date, but section 653aa has no such provision and,
as such, runs into problems with the second prong of the § 301 test.63
Section 653aa, at its heart, imposes criminal penalties for infringing
upon copyright without the addition of other material elements and covers
copyrighted works over which Congress has claimed exclusive federal
jurisdiction. As a result, it seems that section 653aa is preempted by
federal law under § 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 except for its
application to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972.
b. Federal Preemption Under General Preemption Doctrines
In addition to finding federal preemption under specific statutory
provisions like § 301, courts can also analyze state statutes under the
regular preemption doctrines.64 Under these doctrines, a state law that
frustrates specific provisions of the federal Copyright Act is preempted.65
Since section 653aa has the effect of essentially convicting people of
copyright infringement under state law in instances where they would be
60. Id.
61. Id. § 301(c).
62. WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 295 (6th ed. 1986).
63. Cal. Penal Code § 653h (West 2006). Section 653(h) is typical of state statutes dealing
with sound recordings. "[F]ederal preemption does not apply to sound recordings fixed earlier
than February 15, 1972; therefore, most states have enacted statutes to protect copyright interests
in pre-1972 recordings." Timothy D. Howell, Intellectual Property Pirates: Congress Raises the
Stakes in the Modern Battle to Protect Copyrights and Safeguard the United States Economy, 27
ST. MARY's L.J. 613, 667 n.199 (1996).
64. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869-74 (2000) (holding that the
express preemption clause in the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 does not bar the ordinary
working of conflict preemption principles).
65. See, e.g., Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
copyright owner cannot be prohibited from exercising his right under federal law to publish his
work, simply by virtue of an allegation that the material contained therein constitutes another's
trade secret, protected under state law).
innocent under federal copyright law, the act does frustrate certain
provisions in federal Copyright Act. For example, section 653aa does not
offer the same exceptions for fair use as federal copyright law does. Under
federal law, "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright." 66 The fair use doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason which takes into account a set of criteria, including
the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
and portion of the work used, and the effect of the use on the market.67
Although section 653aa only applies to the sharing of substantial
portions of a copyrighted work, there are no other references to other fair
use considerations and there is no mention of fair use as an exception or
defense to the statute.68 Since the statute creates a state criminal cause of
action, federal copyright law and its fair use exception do not apply. This
means that a user sharing copyrighted work on the Internet for "fair use"
would be liable under section 653aa, but not under federal copyright laws.
For example, electronically disseminating the incidental reproduction, in a
newsreel or broadcast, of work located in the scene of an event being
reported would be legitimate "fair use" under federal copyright law, but
would violate section 653aa. 69 By effectively excluding the "fair use"
protections which Congress saw fit to provide alleged copyright infringers,
section 653aa frustrates a specific provision of the federal Copyright Act
and thus is preempted by federal law even under general preemption
doctrines.
2. Preemption of California Penal Code Section 653aa by Federal Statutes
Involving a Minor's Right to Privacy Online and Protection from
Unsolicited Commercial Emails
Not only does the California "True Name and Address" statute run
into preemption problems with federal copyright law, but it also potentially
runs afoul of federal laws designed to protect Internet privacy, especially
those dealing with minors and with unsolicited emails. Whether section
653aa is actually preempted by these federal laws must be determined by
studying each of the statutes. Preemption may apply whenever federal
66. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
67. Id.
68. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653aa (West 2006).
69. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
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power is validly exercised to legislate.7° When analyzing a federal law,
courts tend to presume that it is not intended to preempt state law,
especially when the power is one traditionally left to the states.
71
When this intent is manifested, however, it can either be done
expressly or impliedly.72 Express preemption requires specific language in
the federal statute that defines the preemption's existence and scope.73
Implied preemption can be found either when the federal law was intended
to occupy an entire field or when it conflicts with the state law, either
through impossibility or because the state law is an obstacle.74 Intent to
occupy an entire field can be inferred by creating pervasive federal
regulation of that field, by touching a field in which the federal interest is
sufficiently dominant to preclude state laws, or through the nature of the
purpose of the federal law.75 Impossibility preemption occurs when
complying with both state and federal law is physically impossible.76 A
state law is an obstacle to a federal law when it "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 77  Obstacle preemption is often found when the state law
discourages behavior that federal law specifically encourages. 78 However,
it will not be found simply because the state law is in "general tension with
the broad or abstract goals that may be attributed to various federal laws or
programs. 79
a. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA)
In 1998, Congress passed the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act (COPPA), which dealt with concerns over the online collection of
70. CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 316
(2d ed. 2005).
71. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96-97 (1992).





77. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228
U.S. 115, 132 (1913) ("[T]o the extent that the state law interferes with or frustrates the operation
of the acts of Congress, its provisions must yield to the superior Federal power given to Congress
by the Constitution.").
78. See Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (holding that a Florida law
refusing unemployment benefits to any person unemployed as a result of a labor dispute was an
obstacle to the federal objective of encouraging compliance with federal labor laws).
79. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 487 (2d ed. 1988).
Spring 20081 FROM THE FRINGES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
personal information from children, especially from commercial websites.8°
COPPA states that "it is unlawful for an operator of a website or online
service directed to children, or any operator that has actual knowledge that
it is collecting personal information from a child, to collect personal
information from a child" unless it provides notice of doing so on their
website or it obtains verifiable parental consent.81 "Children" are defined
as those under the age of thirteen. 82 "Personal information" includes a first
and last name, a home or physical address, or an email address.83
COPPA has an explicit preemption clause which states that "[n]o State
or local government may impose any liability for commercial activities or
actions by operators in interstate or foreign commerce in connection with
an activity or action described in this chapter that is inconsistent with the
treatment of those activities or actions under this section., 84 However, this
clause does not apply here because section 653aa only imposes liability on
minors, not the website operators who might obtain their information.
It is possible, though, that COPPA implicitly preempts section 653aa
through congressional intent to occupy the field of protecting a minor's
right to privacy online. Even though privacy laws are not exclusively
federal, the purpose of the interest at stake in COPPA is of a nature that
would benefit from federal regulation.85 Because of the global nature of
the Internet, any laws dealing with it are more effective if they cover a
large jurisdiction. In the case of COPPA, having piecemeal and
contradictory laws from state to state on the issue would make it difficult
for violators of a minor's right to privacy to be prosecuted. Most instances
in which a minor's right to privacy is violated over the Internet are going to
involve parties from different states, so allowing separate state laws in the
field would defeat the purpose of COPPA. Since section 653aa cannot
operate without impairing Congress and COPPA's ability to operate in its
field, this might suggest that section 653aa is preempted.86
80. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 6501.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 6502.
85. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2006).
86. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The test of
whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is
whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives."). See also San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) ("Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow
the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential
frustration of national purposes.").
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However, since courts tend to construe narrowly the field which a
federal law occupies in order to prevent a legislative vacuum, these
arguments might not be enough to convince a court to find that section
653aa is subject to field preemption.8 7 More specifically, COPPA only
restricts the ways in which commercial site owners can knowingly gather
information from minors. 8   Section 653aa, on the other hand, forces
minors to divulge their information on file sharing networks, which are not
commercial sites and do not collect personal information.89 Also, COPPA
already has a specific preemption clause that does not specify a field wide
enough to preempt section 653aa, which confirms that Congress likely did
not intend a statute like section 653aa to be preempted by COPPA. As a
result, it is likely that a court will not find that section 653aa unduly
intrudes on the "field" protected under COPPA.
In addition to field preemption, one could argue that section 653aa is a
considerable barrier to the purposes of COPPA and therefore fits under
obstacle preemption. It defeats the purpose of COPPA to have a state
statute that forces minors, under threat of fine and imprisonment, to provide
their personal information online, regardless of parental consent, in a way
that is accessible to all Internet users, including the site operators that
COPPA is attempting to restrict. Basically, section 653aa uses state law to
defeat the very interests that COPPA is trying to protect. However, this
does not necessarily mean that section 653aa is preempted under this
analysis. As mentioned earlier, COPPA liability is aimed at website
operators, while section 653aa liability is aimed at minors. As a result,
whether obstacle preemption is found here depends on whether a court
would construe the purposes of COPPA wide enough to find that section
653aa is a significant obstacle to that purpose.
There is no impossibility preemption here because it is not physically
impossible for a minor to comply with both section 653aa and COPPA.
Even if a minor decides to share a copyrighted work online and complies
with section 653aa by disclosing his or her personal information, he or she
is not specifically violating COPPA. COPPA is violated by owners of
commercial websites, not the minors themselves.
90
In short, the strongest argument for preemption of section 653aa under
COPPA would be obstacle preemption, but there is a lot of wiggle room for
a court to go either way on this issue. Some considerations would be how
87. MASSEY, supra note 70, at 317.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 6502.
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653aa (West 2006).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 6502
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wide to imply the scope of COPPA's purpose and preemption field and
how large a frustration of that purpose is needed to warrant preemption.
b. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
Section 653aa also has potential preemption issues with federal acts
designed to lower the number of unsolicited commercial emails sent to
users' accounts. One such statute, the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, created a
unified federal system regulating the sending of spam, or unsolicited
commercial email.9' After looking at studies, Congress found there was "a
substantial government interest in regulation of commercial electronic mail
on a nationwide basis., 92 In response, the CAN-SPAM Act made it
unlawful to send spam emails to email addresses automatically obtained
from a website or other online service where the website or service has a
posted privacy policy stating that they will not transfer addresses from their
site to another party.93 The Act also banned sending spam emails
containing fraudulent header information,94 required the inclusion of
certain information in spam email,95 and prohibited sending further spam
emails to those users who have chosen to opt-out of receiving further
communication.96
The CAN-SPAM Act, like COPPA, has a specific preemption clause,
this one including preemption of any state statute that "expressly regulates
the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the
extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception
in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information
attached thereto. 97 The Act also specifies that it should not be construed
to preempt "state laws that are not specific to electronic mail., 98 Since
section 653aa does not directly regulate the use of electronic mail, it would
not fall under the Act's explicit preemption.
The explicit preemption clause also makes it unlikely that Congress
intended to "occupy the field" of spam regulation to the point of
preempting a state statute like section 653aa, which does not purport to deal
with spam email. One could make field preemption arguments similar to
91. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act
of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006).
92. Id. § 7704.
93. Id.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1037.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 7704.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 7707.
98. Id.
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those made for COPPA, but since courts tend to narrowly view the field
occupied by a federal statute, it is unlikely that a court would find that
section 653aa is invalidated through a field preemption analysis.
There is, however, a tenable argument that section 653aa is an
obstacle to the objectives of the CAN-SPAM Act. One of the purposes of
the Act is to prevent the sending of spam to email addresses automatically
obtained from websites and other online services. 99 Since section 653aa
requires users of P2P networks, which are online services, to append their
full names and email or physical addresses to "commercial works," it can
conflict with that purpose. Compliance with section 653aa would vastly
increase the number of email addresses available on P2P networks for
spammers to automatically gather, effectively promoting the sending of
more spain emails. Like with obstacle preemption under COPPA, though,
whether there is preemption depends largely on how broadly one defines
the purposes of the federal statute. If viewed narrowly, CAN-SPAM
targets those who send spam emails, while section 653aa targets copyright
infringers. This view seems unduly narrow, though, so it is certainly
possible that a court would find that the CAN-SPAM Act preempts section
653aa.
3. Privacy Issues
Section 653aa forces file sharers to put their real names and addresses
on all "commercial work" files they trade. This creates questions on
whether section 653aa violates privacy rights created under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution.
a. The Right of Privacy in the United States Constitution
The United States Constitution does not specifically mention any right
of privacy. 100 However, the United States Supreme Court has found that
the right to privacy is an implied fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution.'01 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court held that the interest
of privacy includes "the individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of
personal matters."' 2 This "informational privacy" is frequently interpreted
as a property interest over one's personal information.10 3 However, it is
unclear whether the Whalen Court intended informational privacy to be a
99. Id. § 7701.
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
101. Id.
102. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
103. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000).
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mere constitutional interest or an actual constitutional right.' °4 While a
constitutional interest in informational privacy could be outweighed by the
government's need for the information, a constitutional right in
informational privacy could only be set aside when outweighed by a
compelling government interest or a competing constitutional right. m
05
Many lower federal courts, however, have interpreted informational
privacy as a constitutional right.'06  The majority of these courts have
weighed privacy and government interests in a general balancing test that
uses some form of heightened scrutiny. 10 7 The Ninth Circuit, for example,
balances "the government's interest in having or using the information
against the individual's interest in denying access."'0 8 The Ninth Circuit
also stated that "[t]he government may seek and use information covered
by the right to privacy if it can show that its use of the information would
advance a legitimate state interest and that its actions are narrowly tailored
to meet the legitimate interest."' 0 9 Under such tests, though, there have
been few cases where the government's interests were outweighed by
privacy interests and this often only occurred when the government has
compelled disclosure of highly personal or sensitive information.110 How
personal or sensitive the information must be to create a privacy interest is
unclear.11' Some courts have held there is at least some privacy protection
for home addresses, but the expectation of privacy for that kind of
information is fairly low. 1
12
In Whalen, the Court examined a New York statute which required
physicians to identify patients obtaining Schedule II drugs, a class of drugs
having a potential for abuse. 113 This information would be recorded to a
centralized computer file maintained by the state Department of Health.
14
The plaintiffs, some of them patients, claimed that the statute violated their
104. See Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1125 (2002).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1126. However, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have not recognized informational
privacy as a constitutional right. Id.
107. Id.
108. Doe v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991).
109. Id.
110. Lin, supra note 104, at 1127.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We are not insensitive
to the argument that notification implicates plaintiffs' privacy interest by disclosing their home
addresses.").
113. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977).
114. Id.
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federal constitutional right to privacy because misuse of the computer data
could cause a leak to the public that would stigmatize them as drug
addicts. 1 5  The Court, however, held that the government interest in
disclosure of this medical information to state agencies concerned with
public health was essential and was within the state's broad police
powers. 16 The Court also found that the possibility of abuse of the statute
did not implicate any constitutionally recognized right of privacy.1 17 There
was no support for the claim that security provisions would be inadequately
administered and there had been no such abuse in the past.118 Since there
was no protected privacy interest, the Court found that the state's essential
interests outweighed any potential for abuse. 19
When analyzing section 653aa, we must balance the privacy interests
at stake against the state's legitimate objectives. As discussed above, some
lower courts have recognized an inherent, if weak, privacy interest in one's
address. 20  In the instance of section 653aa though, this interest is
heightened by several factors. First, section 653aa forces the inclusion of
the person's full name, which, with the address, further identifies the
individual. Second, unlike in Whalen, where public disclosure would only
occur if the statute's safeguards on the information were abused, section
653aa inherently forces public disclosure of personal information. Lastly,
there is an intrinsic stigma associated with the disclosure. It is likely that,
in an attempt to avoid violating section 653aa, Internet users would attach
their personal information to many files that they share on P2P networks,
even if they are not "commercial works" under the statute. Even if Internet
users follow section 653aa to the letter, they can be forced to disclose their
identity in situations where they are not violating federal copyright law,
such as when they are complying with the federal "fair use" exception.
The disclosure of information in these cases carries with it the unjustified
public stigma that the person in question is a copyright infringer, even
though they might not have committed any crime.
This privacy interest is counterbalanced by strong state interests.
States have a legitimate and broad interest in exercising their police
powers. 21 Whether section 653aa's copyright issues are a proper goal for
115. Id. at 595.
116. Id. at 602.
117. Id. at 603-04.
118. Id. at601.
119. Id. at 602.
120. See Paul P. v. Vemiero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999).
121. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597 ("State legislation which has some effect on individual liberty
or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole
Spring 20081
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
the states to deal with, as opposed to the federal legislature, is a complex
question and is addressed earlier in this Note. Regardless, there is certainly
a strong societal interest in the protection of copyright ownership and
section 653aa allows the government to better identify those who are
violating copyright laws. However, it is questionable whether section
653aa is narrowly tailored to meet that interest. While the statute helps to
expose the identities of alleged copyright violators, it also publicly exposes
those who have not even violated federal copyright law, as discussed
above. Also, the state has no authority to regulate copyright, especially
when that regulation is inconsistent with the copyright laws passed by
Congress, who has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue.
Whether a full name and address are considered private and sensitive
enough under these circumstances to outweigh the state's interests is
unclear. The Supreme Court has not confirmed a constitutional right to
informational privacy and has not presented a clear test of when such an
interest would be violated. 22  However, considering the decisions of the
lower federal courts, there at least seems to be enough of a privacy interest
involved with section 653aa to make a good argument that it violates the
federal constitutional right to privacy.
b. The Right of Privacy in the California State Constitution
The California State Constitution, unlike the United States
Constitution, has an explicit right of privacy. 2 3 In fact, it has the most
protective state constitutional provision for privacy.1 24  The provision
provides all Californians the rights of "enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."' 125 California's right to privacy,
unlike the federal right, clearly includes informational privacy under its
wing and provides specific protections to enforce it.126 In fact, courts have
confirmed that California's privacy right "exists to prevent governmental
snooping, to inhibit the overly broad collection and retention of
unnecessary personal information or the improper use of information
or in part. For we have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in
experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern.").
122. Lin, supra note 104, at 1125.
123. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 326 (Cal. 1997). This explicit
right "protects a larger zone of privacy in the area of financial and personal affairs than the
federal right .. " Wilson v. Cal. Health Facilities Comm'n, 110 Cal. App. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980).
124. Lin, supra note 104, at 1131.
125. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
126. Lin, supra note 104, at 1133.
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properly obtained for a specific purpose, and to avoid the evils incident to
lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records."'
' 27
To find an invasion of privacy under the California Constitution, a
court must find that the claim satisfies three elements. 28 First, the plaintiff
must identify a "specific, legally protected privacy interest."' 29 One such
general interest is in "precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive
and confidential information.' 30  Information is private "when well-
established norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over
its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or
indignity."'' These norms are determined from the law governing the
right to privacy. 32  Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of
privacy under the circumstances, which partially is dependent on the
specific circumstances of the case. 33 A reasonable expectation of privacy
is found when there is "an objective entitlement founded on broadly based
and widely accepted community norms."'134  Lastly, the defendant's
conduct must constitute a serious invasion of privacy that is "an egregious
breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right."'' 35 However, even
if an incursion into individual privacy is found under the three elements, it
can be justified if outweighed by legitimate and important competing
interests. 36 The force of the compelling interests is lessened if there are
effective alternatives to the violating conduct that would have a lesser
impact on privacy. 37 Outside of these three elements, though, the kind of
privacy interest involved and the nature of seriousness of the invasion
remain the critical factors in the analysis. 38 When a privacy interest is not
fundamental, a general balancing of interests is involved.1
39
Under the first element, one must show that section 653aa's forced
disclosure of a file sharer's full name and physical and/or email address
violates a legally protected privacy interest. In general, California courts
127. Richards v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).




132. Id. at 36.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 37.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 38.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 34.
139. Id.
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seem to have recognized a person's address to involve such an interest. In
Fredenburg v. City of Fremont, the plaintiff challenged the disclosure of
the general location of sexual predators on the Internet pursuant to
California's Megan's Law. 14  The California Court of Appeal found that
there was no federal or state privacy right over the general location of one's
residence. 14 The court also found, in dicta, that even if the law forced the
disclosure of people's specific addresses, the privacy interests at stake were
outweighed by the Act's purpose of informing the public for its own
safety.142 This would suggest that when a law compels disclosure of an
individual's specific physical address, there is a legitimate privacy interest
and the interest must be balanced against the government's compelling
objectives.
In the specific instance of section 653aa, this assertion is bolstered by
the fact that, unlike the hypothetical law discussed in the dicta of
Fredenburg, section 653aa requires disclosure of a name along with the
address, which specifically identifies the individual in question and thus
increases the privacy interest. Also, as discussed earlier under the federal
privacy right analysis, there is, under certain circumstances, an unjustified
stigma in the forced disclosure of information under section 653aa where
the user has not actually violated federal copyright law. In these instances,
the forced disclosure publicly labels the individual as a copyright infringer
when they have done no wrong. Such a stigma, when undeserved, certainly
involves the "unjustified embarrassment or indignity" required to prove the
existence of a legally protected privacy interest.
The second element requires that section 653aa's forced disclosure
violates an individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. "[C]ustoms,
practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities may create
or inhibit expectations of privacy."'143 The forum in which section 653aa
governs is the Internet, which, in terms of privacy, is a unique place. Any
information posted publicly on the Internet is instantly available to the
entire world. Because of this, many Internet users are highly concerned
about posting their personal information online.' 44 Even social networking
sites, such as MySpace, respect this need for privacy and hide full names
140. Fredenburg v. City of Fremont, 119 Cal. App. 4th 408, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
141. Id. at422.
142. Id. at421-22.
143. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 36.
144. Ninety-two percent of Americans say they are concerned about threats to their personal
privacy when they use the Internet and sixty-seven percent say they are "very concerned." FTC,
PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 2 (2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy200O/privacy2000.pdf.
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and email addresses from others outside the user's personal network.
14 5
While many individuals accept publishing their full names and addresses in
other public forums, such as a telephone directory, they are more hesitant
to do so on the Internet, where there is a heightened interest in being able to
present opinions anonymously.
146
However, some factors might diminish this expectation of privacy.
First, "advance notice of an impending action may serve to limit an
intrusion upon personal dignity and security.' 47 Since section 653aa gives
notice that those sharing commercial works will be required to disclose
their personal information, there is arguably a lesser expectation of privacy.
Next, studies have found that the vast majority of websites collect some
type of personal information, so perhaps the disclosure that section 653aa
requires is not unusual enough to violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 148  However, in instances where websites collect personal
information, the disclosure of such information is voluntary and the
information is often only viewable by the administrators of the website in
accordance with the website's privacy policy. In the case of section 653aa,
though, the disclosure is completely public and involuntary. Overall, even
though the statute provides notice and many websites collect information, it
seems fair to say that an individual probably has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in not being forced to disclose their full name and address to the
public when on the Internet.
For the third element, the privacy interests implicated by section
653aa must be serious enough to constitute an egregious breach of social
norms. The terms of this element are unclear, and probably intentionally
so. A court could certainly go either way on this issue. On one hand,
disclosing a full name and address on the Internet opens an individual up to
possible harassment and embarrassment, especially since a disclosure under
section 653aa carries with it the stigma that the individual is a copyright
violator. On the other hand, the privacy interest is not particularly
fundamental. The disclosure, while embarrassing, does not reveal any
highly sensitive information. A person's full name and address often can
be found in many places, such as a telephone book or a school directory,
145. "With the exception of inviting friends, adding friends, and notifications, a user's email
address is not shared or displayed to people within a user's personal network." MySpace.com,
Privacy Policy, http://www.myspace.com (follow "Privacy" hyperlink at bottom of page).
146. Seventy-six percent of "consumers who are not generally concerned about the misuse of
their personal information fear privacy intrusions on the Internet." FTC, supra note 144, at 2.
147. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 36.
148. Ninety-seven percent of the sites in the study's random sample collected "an email
address or some other type of personal identifying information." FTC, supra note 144, at 9.
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but this disclosure is voluntary, unlike the forced disclosures in section
653aa. Whether the privacy interests intertwined with section 653aa's
forced disclosure are "serious" is matter of interpretation. However, if
forced to guess, I would think a court would decline to find that the privacy
violation here is serious enough.
If a court does find that all three elements have been met, it still can
justify the privacy violation if it is outweighed by a legitimate state interest.
Here, as mentioned earlier in my analysis of the federal right of privacy,
there is a strong social interest in protecting intellectual property.
Businesses in the United States depend on copyright law to maintain
control over and profit from their intellectual works. One could question,
though, whether section 653aa really serves a legitimate interest at all,
since it deals with copyright issues specifically reserved for Congress, not
the states.
These state interests also can be served by effective alternatives to
section 653aa that have less of an impact on privacy interests. Section
653aa was designed originally to circumvent the subpoena process built
into federal copyright law, which required a plaintiff to fulfill certain
requirements to obtain the personal information of a suspected copyright
infringer.149 The subpoena process is designed to ensure that a plaintiff has
sufficient evidence before forcing the disclosure of an individual's private
information.1 50 If copyright owners such as the RIAA wish to be able to
obtain information more easily on copyright infringers, it should be through
such a subpoena, not a law like section 653aa. Since effective alternatives
exist that involve a smaller invasion of privacy, the state interest in section
653aa is diminished.
Overall, the forced disclosure of an individual's full name and address
in section 653aa seems to present a legally protected privacy interest and a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the first and second prongs of
California's privacy interest analysis. It is more questionable whether the
disclosure constitutes a serious invasion of privacy under the third prong.
However, since effective alternatives to the disclosure required in section
653aa invade less on an individual's right of privacy, it is possible that a
court could find that the statute violates the right of privacy. This is
especially likely considering that California's right of privacy is presumed
to be stronger than its federal counterpart because it, unlike the federal
149. See Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis of S. 1506, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2
(Cal. 2004), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov (search 2003-2004 session for Bill Number 1506).
150. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 767-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
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right, is explicit and because it specifically protects the individual's control
over their personal information.15
B. Policy Concerns
1. Use of State Criminal Enforcement Resources Under California
Penal Code Section 653aa
Enforcing section 653aa would require local governments to spend
money and use law enforcement resources to essentially protect copyright
interests, which, as discussed before, is a job exclusively left to the federal
government by the Copyright Act of 1976. The fiscal effect of section
653aa involves "[p]otential non-state-reimbursable costs to local
governments for enforcement, offset to some extent by fine revenues."'
' 52
Although there is no record of any prosecutions under section 653aa, this
statute has the potential of substantially burdening local law enforcement
and state courts over an issue of copyright that already is covered by the
federal government and its judicial and enforcement resources. 153 Federal
copyright law already provides actual damages plus profits or a statutory
civil penalty of up to $150,000 for every instance of willfully distributing a
copyrighted work, even if it is distributed to only one person. 154 It also
provides both preliminary and permanent injunctions against copyright
infringement. 155  Since federal copyright law already has established
substantial penalties for its violation, mirroring enforcement for what is
essentially the same right might be a waste of precious local resources.
The fact that penalties for copyright violations already are severe also
means that enforcement of section 653aa will not provide much of an
additional deterrent effect on those who wish to infringe copyright. It is
unlikely that a potential copyright infringer who is undeterred by
considerable federal penalties will be persuaded into compliance by
enforcement of section 653aa, especially when doing so would reveal the
infringer's personal information to copyright holders and would make it
easier for the infringer to be held liable under federal copyright laws. As a
result, using precious government resources to enforce section 653aa would
151. Lin, supra note 104, at 1130.
152. Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis of S. 1506, at 2.
153. In a statement against section 653aa, the Electronic Freedom Foundation asserted that
"[c]opyright law already provides for significant civil and criminal penalties. The bill will only
add to the already overloaded dockets of California police, district attorneys, and courts with low-
level criminal prosecutions that are, in nearly all cases, duplicative of possible federal cases." Id.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
155. Id. § 502.
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not only be ineffective because it merely mirrors federal enforcement
efforts but also is ineffective as an additional deterrent to infringing
copyright. It seems that such resources would be better spent on
enforcement that more efficiently accomplishes the government's
objectives.
IV. Legislative Alternatives to
California Penal Code Section 653aa
California's "True Name and Address" Act has numerous legal issues
surrounding it, but its troubles stem from two basic problems. First, the
fact that the statute requires public disclosure of personal information from
alleged infringers raises numerous privacy and obstacle preemption
concerns, especially since it also requires minors to disclose their personal
information. This issue is confounded by the fact that the scope of the
statute goes beyond targeting just those who have infringed federal
copyright law, especially in the area of fair use. Also, since subpoenas and
other such methods present effective alternatives to section 653aa forced
disclosure while implicating fewer privacy and preemption concerns, the
reasons for allowing this disclosure become less tenable. Second, it is also
clear that state law is not the proper forum for dealing with infringement of
federal copyright law because of federal preemption issues.
There are two possible ways to address the state's legitimate objective
of identifying copyright infringers while avoiding the problems of section
653aa. First, one could pass a law similar to the California statute, except
on a federal level. This would, at the very least, remove the preemption
issues. Such a statute could openly address copyright issues without
running afoul of the Copyright Act. If presented as a part of federal
copyright law, the statute would also instate the protections that section
653aa lacks, such as "fair use," and so would more narrowly target only
those who are actually infringing upon federal copyright law. The privacy
concerns inherent to forcing public disclosure of personal information
would still exist, but since the federal statute would be more narrowly
tailored to only target infringers under federal copyright law, it would be
less likely to create an unjustified stigma on those who did not actually
violate copyright law.
A second option that would avoid both the preemption and privacy
concerns is devising a new method of federal subpoena. Ideally, the
subpoena would allow copyright holders to protect their property rights
while also installing the necessary safeguards to prevent an undue intrusion
of an individual's right to privacy. The DMCA subpoena was created to
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deal with just such a situation and it only became useless because of later
changes in P2P technology. One solution, then, would be to create a new
DMCA-style subpoena that would allow the RIAA to gain information
from ISPs even when the ISP does not actually have infringing material on
their servers. However, such a subpoena raises issues of the ISP's privacy
concerns. When the ISP has no connection to the copyright infringement,
why should it be forced to disclose its customers' information? Also, a
DMCA-style subpoena requires little or no evidence of actual copyright
infringement, so such a subpoena could reveal a user's private information
even when the user has not violated copyright law. However, this would be
better than forcing users to publicly display their information.
V. Conclusion
When the California legislature passed section 653aa, its stated
intention was to make it easier for copyright holders to identify alleged
copyright infringers online by circumventing the limitations of federal
copyright law. This, understandably, creates numerous problems.
Congress, when devising its federal law on copyright, worked carefully to
balance the rights of copyright holders against the rights of other
individuals. For a state to disrupt this balance by introducing their own
laws on the subject, especially when the Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly
forbids it, destroys the congressional goals behind the federal copyright
scheme. Section 653aa's invasive disclosure requirements only further tilt
this balance away from the rights of the individual. While copyright
holders such as the RIAA have a right to be able to identify copyright
infringers on the Internet, laws that allow this identification must be
properly safeguarded and narrowly tailored to that interest to be legitimate.
When, in the case of section 653aa, these concerns are ignored, the rights
of the individual are in peril. Whatever laws are passed in the future to
deal with these complex issues, it pays to keep these considerations in
mind.
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